This month marks the third anniversary of a dark chapter in global politics.  In May 2005, hundreds of Uzbek people took to the streets of Andijan to protest the authoritarian government of Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan and a holdover from Soviet times.  The protests followed attacks on several government buildings, including a jail from which several state prisoners were freed.  These events, unfolding in the shadow of neighboring Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, held the promise of change for people who had been subjected to state fiat since the dawn of the modern era.  Such hopes were shattered by a hail of bullets, leaving some hundreds of Uzbek citizens dead (no ones knows how many-Tashkent claims 187 killed while Western human rights groups put the number around 750).

Certainly the Andijan Massacre, as it has come to be called, was a tragedy, but it only attained global political significance when it became an issue in the new “Great Game” for influence in Central Asia.  The killings rightly prompted a sharp criticism from the United States which, in turn, caused Uzbekistan to eject the U.S. military from its base at Karshi-Khanaba; an event considered a major strategic setback by many commentators, given the base’s role in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  President Karimov was embraced by China during a previously planned state visit to Beijing at the end of May and also won the implicit support of regional players in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The Andijan Incident and its aftermath prompts the broader question of how the United States should approach Central Asia given its largely authoritarian politics, powerful neighbors (Russia and China), and geo-strategic importance.  America’s primary interests in the region are two-fold: energy and Islamism (sound familiar?).  According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s report on the Caspian Sea region, there are between 12 and 49 billion barrels of oil and about 232 trillion cubic feet of natural gas waiting to be exploited from Central Asia.  All of this essentially makes the region  Eurasia’s energy hub both for petroleum:

And for natural gas:

Moreover, since Central Asia is landlocked and capital starved, it is a tempting target for American investment in energy extraction, refining, and transport.

Its proximity to Afghanistan makes the region an important part of the war effort there.  Though the military has been edged out of Uzbekistan, it still makes use of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and has agreements with other countries for overflight rights and expedited transit of war material.  In addition to its supporting role in the American War on Terrorism, Central Asia has, at times, found itself at risk from Islamic extremism.  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been responsible for several incidents in the region (as well as making for a convenient scape-goat following Andijan) and militant Islamic forces were present amongst the anti-government opposition in Tajikistan’s five year civil war.

Central Asia is also a tempting piece of real estate for those in the national security establishment who view China and Russia with increasing apprehension and see an American military presence in the region as a hedge against the expanding influence of Eurasia’s giants.  Both countries are deepening their relationships with Central Asia through bilateral diplomacy as well as regional groupings like the SCO and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

With all of this at stake, what is the American Empire to do?  It would be a mistake to ignore Central Asia entirely.  As September 11th clearly demonstrated, turning a blind eye to even the remotest corner of the globe can have serious consequences in the 21st century.  However, I do not believe the United States must kow-tow to Eurasia’s potentates and lavish military aid on their regimes in order to secure permanent basing rights the region.

America’s fundamental interests, increasing energy exports and controlling Islamic terrorism, are already being served by the domestic policies of Central Asia’s states.  The governments therein are searching for the means to develop their energy sectors and they are secular by nature, being descended from the Soviet bureaucracy of old.

As for Russian and Chinese influence, the Soviet legacy has also imparted a keen sense of the dangers entailed by the dominance of powerful outsiders.  No Central Asian country wishes to return to a state of imperial tutelage, whether under the guise of Moscow or Beijing (or Washington, for that matter).  Central Asia’s rulers are, by and large, clever enough to play the competitors in the Great Game off one another, and the United States should facilitate that by offering its diplomatic support as a counterweight to  Russia and China while not seeking undue influence itself.  (This leaves aside the fact that the “threat” from Russia and China is largely a chimera, but that’s a different post…)

In short, America should remain engaged with Central Asia, but not through permanent military bases.  And though we must, as always, recognize the limits of American influence on the internal affairs of others, we should not hesitate to speak out against the injustices committed against the people of Central Asia.  We ought not play the Great Game, for the prize simply isn’t worth the effort.

It’s an all too familiar scenario from the 21st century urban battlefield.  An Iraqi soldier posted at the security barrier in Sadr City, Baghdad, is killed by sniper.  American military advisers are dispatched to rectify the situation.  Their solution: lase the building housing the sniper and blast it with a Hellfire missile.  This is but one example of the intermittent but fierce combat faced by U.S. troops in the city.  Quoth the New York Times:

The formal truce that was announced in the Green Zone with great fanfare on Monday has meant nothing here. Shiite militias have been trying to blast gaps in the wall, firing at the American troops who are completing it and maneuvering to pick off the Iraqi soldiers who have been charged with keeping an eye on the partition.

American forces have answered with tank rounds, helicopter rocket strikes and even satellite-guided bombs to try to silence the militia fire. On some stretches, the urban landscape has been transformed as the Americans have leveled buildings militia fighters have used as perches to mount their attacks.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, an official for the United Nations is speaking out about lethal raids by “foreign intelligence services” that are, in some cases, taking the lives of civilians with no accountability.  The official doesn’t specify details about these foreign agencies, but my guess is he refers to CIA or SOCOM missions targeting al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

If America’s chief interest in these two conflicts is finding and killing international terrorists who might otherwise strike the United States proper, this is all just fine.  However, if we intend to fulfill John McCain’s rosy scenario of a democratic Iraq and Afghanistan with minimal violence by 2013, we have another thing coming.  Dropping a 2,000 pound JDAM on a building in Baghdad to eliminate a sniper may be tactically expedient, but it won’t win very many “hearts and minds;” certainly not those of the building’s owners when they return, nor their extended family if they happened to be inside the building at the time.

Americans face a difficult decision about the conflicts in which we are now engaged.  If we decide that democratic state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan is truly in our interests, we must realistically assess what accomplishing this will entail.  It will mean a long-term commitment for years to come.  It will mean recruiting more troops for the Army and Marine Corps and putting them in harms way; essentially expanding the “surge” and making it permanent.  It will mean changing tactics by drawing on the successes of those American units that have worked with local officials, successfully blending the military and political, to secure their areas of operation.  It will mean all of this, but it will still will not guarantee victory.

On the other hand, we could scale back our objectives and simply focus on attacking the terrorist threat in both countries without regard for the broader political implications of our actions.  This path, too, has its risks and comes with no assurance of success.  The only thing of which we can be certain is that if we maintain our present compromise approach of using excessive firepower to make up for deficiencies in personnel, we will neither build democracies nor secure America when our wars come to an end.